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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs agree with the statement of the case as presented 
by Petitioner, except to add the following: 
At Trial, Plaintiffs and Defendant American Savings and Loan 
read a Stipulation of Facts into the record. The other parties 
accepted that Factual Stipulation. Defendant Liston then 
proceeded with evidence as it affected his claim of Interest in 
the property. 
From the decision of the Trial Court, Plaintiff appealed 
that portion of the Judgment that reinstated the Lien of 
Petitioner. No other parties joined in the Appeal. The Court of 
Appeals reversed and defendants filed a petition for Certiorari. 
Plaintiffs were granted an extension until the 21st day of 
November, 1987 for filing their brief in opposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts correctly recites the Stipulation of 
the parties and the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", 
except that Plaintiff does not agree with the characterization of 
some facts as strictly Findings of Fact to wit: 
The Courts Finding that Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had 
more than sufficient information to necessitate a further 
inguiry is set forth as both a Finding of Fact and a Conclusion 
of Law. (F/F 24, C/L 1). 
The finding that such an inguiry would have, in all 
1 
probability, lead to the Discovery that the Trust Deed had not 
been paid is both a Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law. (F/F 
25, C/L 2). 
The Finding that Wayne Peck and/or Brad Pentelute knew or 
should have known something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' 
representations of their fee ownership is both a Finding of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law. (F/F 26, C/L 3). 
The release of American Savings and Loans interest in the 
property, which set the stage for the entire chain of events, was 
a negligent and unilateral act of American Savings and Loan. (C/L 
30). 
ARGUMENT 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED IN THIS 
MATTER. 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ASSESSED THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW FOR A CASE PRESENTED ON STIPULATED FACTS.. 
The process of Trial requires both a determination of what 
actually occurred, and the interpretation of the meaning of those 
acts as filtered through the analysis of law. Thus, when the 
trial Judge acts in the dual capacity as both trier of fact and 
Arbiter of the law his ruling is divided into two parts in order 
to assist the parties and counsel in understanding the Judgment 
and to assist Appellate Courts in fulfilling their review 
process. 
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At least part of the justification for this bifurcation 
springs from the review process that provides different standards 
of review for "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusion of Law": 
Without Facts, there is no surface upon which to apply the 
template of the law. Facts form pieces of the puzzle, the law 
interprets the picture they form. So while the "Truth" of the 
case may vary, the law is constant. 
For this reason, the process of review afforded to findings 
of the Trial Court will hinge on what type of determination the 
Trial Court is making. 
"Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses".(emphasis added.) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a); State v. Walker, 64 Utah 
Ad. Rep. 10 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1987). Conclusions of Law on the other 
hand are not accorded deference but are simply reviewed for 
correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. CORP., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 
1985). The instant case, however, did not come to the Trial Court 
on a dispute over what occurred, but rather, on what those facts 
meant. 
Petitioner recites six and one half pages of facts in their 
brief, but all reference to the record are either to the Findings 
of the trial judges contained in his Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, and/or the Stipulation of Fact read into the 
3 
record by the parties which created the basis for all Factual 
determinations• 
This phenomena was not lost on the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals in the opinion in the instant case 
notes that the rulings of the trial court as it affects the 
interest of the parties on appeal was not based upon oral or 
documentary evidence but rather, upon a stipulation of facts 
which was read into the record by counsel. Diversified Equities 
v. American Savings, 739 P.2d. 1133 (1987). 
Once such a stipulation has occurred, those facts are deemed 
decided and the trier of fact need not arbitrate differences 
between the parties. 
Petitioner seems to recognize the correctness of the 
Appellate Court's analysis in this regard as they are quick to 
point out that this case involved not just the stipulation, but 
testimony. In part, the Assertion is correct, but it does not 
save them. As noted by the Trial Court in its findings, there 
was testimony: 
"The parties represented at the hearing having 
entered into and presented an Oral Stipulation of 
Fact, agreed to by all the parties so represented, 
and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into 
evidence, and Defendant Mark Engar Liston having 
presented evidence,. . ."[Emphasis added.] 
Findings, Page 2. 
Mr. Liston was not a party to the appeal below or this 
petition. The issues he litigated through testimony are settled 
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and nobody has asked this Court or the Appellate Court to review 
those findings. The dispute of fact that would call upon the 
Judge to view the witnesses and assess their credibility is all a 
part of history. All issues presented to the Appeal Court spring 
from the stipulation of fact. 
The question of what deference to apply during review is 
not governed by technicality, but by substance. It is not a 
matter of whether anyone at any time in the proceedings spoke 
from the stand, but what they testified to, and what evidence the 
court accepted with regards to the issues under review. 
It is significant that petitioner no where points to any 
factual dispute between the parties now before the Court, the 
only dispute between these parties were the conclusions that the 
Trial Court should draw from the events as stipulated. The Court 
of Appeals correctly analyzed the test: 
' "Where the facts are not in material dispute, 
interpretation placed thereon by Trial Court 
becomes a question of law which is not Conclusive 
on Appeal"' Diversified Equities v. American, 
supra at 1136, citing City of Spencer v. Hawkeye 
Security Ins. Co. 216 N.W. 2nd 406, 408 (Iowa, 
1974). 
The Trial Court, as well, recognized that it was not finding 
facts, but drawing legal conclusions. 
In his memorandum decision, the Trial Court states: 
"The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth 
the facts and events, leading up to and necessary 
for the disposition of the claims of the parties 
would be in most part a reiteration of the 
Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should 
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therefore refer to such stipulation when 
necessary"• Memorandum Decision , Page 2. 
The Court then goes on to discuss its conclusions. As the 
Trial Court recognized, there never was a material dispute of 
fact between the parties, and, the Court of Appeals applied 
the proper standard for review. 
II. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
FOR VALUE WAS A LEGAL CONCLUSION IN THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
Petitioner further supports its argument that the wrong 
standard of review was used by attempting to style the 
determination the Court makes with respect to good faith 
purchaser status as one strictly of fact. Petitioner then cites 
several cases which allegedly support the position that the 
determination of whether a party is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and whether such purchaser met requirements of inquiry 
based upon notice is a strictly factual determination. 
Such a position over extends the caselaw and is inconsistent 
with logic or the procedure followed by the Trial Court. 
There is no question that factual questions play 
a significant role in the determination of whether one is a 
good faith purchaser. Normally the jury will have to wade 
through the facts, and will make this determination largely on 
what it decides happened. But they must apply the facts to the 
instruction of the Court on the law to reach a final decision. 
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Thus, petitioner's cases do nol : relegate the determination solely 
to fact, hut characterize correctly the role of the in 
niakluq il\s Idi.'l.iidl tine .. . hv applying the law as presented by 
the Court. 
The case of Be:. Fredericks, - . :- <: ^ev. 1979) 
cited by petiti oner , rt examp i ** ** . therein 
states, "the question whether a par'- a i ide „i <» i-vT-iry, is 
one of fact to be I nvf*"*".igated ^ * . . . J.<-I. au z.t9. The 
C 01 11: I: t h € 11 g : e 3 o 1:1 - - .jnc^upon a vendor or 
similar person witn : i~«>, - onceal a prior grantee ? "nterest, 
does not constitute adequate :c . I lrposes oi rebutting 
t h e pres 1 J in111 1 . , -; *h n Q . +- h e fourt i s 
implicitly recognizing the distinction between determination of 
what occurred factual y and appl i ca ti on :>f facts aqai nst 
standards conduct and behavior. The Washington 
Supreme Court nas clearly recognized that determination of good 
faith purchaser star i hnt|i 
determination of the idct, ... <^ ^ . ..* ,>. - cut * Miebach 
v, Colasurdo, 685 P.2d. < •-vasi:. : Q H ; 
An ana 1 ysis of uuw id^i a * * y he 
guished was addressed ^ «ootr friendly . . N.L.R.B. v 
Marcus Trucking Company, 286 E 2 d 5 83 (2 CA, .19 6 
First q iioti ng from Professor J affe , J 1 ldge Fr :i e n d I! \ st>ii es 1 1 
finding of fact is the assertion that a phenomena has happened or 
is 01; wi ] 3 be happening independent of or anterior tc any 
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assertion as to its legal effect,'" Id., at 590 From this Judge 
Friendly developed three major groupings of determinations. 
The first involved those cases where the definition of the 
terms are not in dispute and it is necessary only to apply the 
raw facts as they are determined to the well settled meanings. 
The second category involve those case disputes where both 
the raw facts and the meanings of the terms to which they are to 
be applied are in guestion. Id. at 590-591. 
And third, are those cases where the facts are not in 
issue, but only the meanings of the terms to which they will be 
applied. Id. at 590-591. 
The first grouping is decided solely on fact. The third 
decided solely on law, and the second combining both law and 
fact. In the instant case all of the facts were read into the 
record by the parties and it became necessary only for the Trial 
Court to determine if these facts met the standards necessary for 
a finding of bona fide purchaser for value, or that proper 
inguiry had been made. 
Petitioner asserts the Trial Court viewed his determination 
as one of fact. To support this position they recite five of the 
Courts "Findings of Facts" from the Finding of Fact and 
Conclusion of law which they prepared following the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court. (Petition for Certiorari, Page 11) They 
do not mention, however, that each of these "Findings of Fact" 
are also listed as Conclusion of Law, numbers 11,6,1,2, and 
8 
3,respectively. Thus, at best, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law they prepared recognized this determination as 
a mixed determination of fact on law. 
But of even more significance is the language of the Court 
itself. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Fredericks wrote: 
"In applying the foregoing legal principle 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts 
and events of this case, the Court concludes that 
neither Dakal nor Diversified was a bona fide 
purchaser of the property." [Emphasis added. . .] 
(Memorandum Decision, Page 6) 
Even the Trial Court did not view its role as a finder of 
fact. The Court accepted the facts as stipulated by the parties 
and made legal conclusions based thereon. 
The basis for review utilized by the Court of Appeals and 
its judgment thereon is correct and the petition should not be 
granted. 
III. 
PLAINTIFFS MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INQUIRY 
GIVEN THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THEM. 
Plaintiff will not repeat its arguments on the merits for 
the purpose of this review, but relys upon the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals and the brief of Plaintiff to the Court of 
Appeals below. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff contends that petitioner has failed to show that 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with prior 
Q 
decisions of this Court and that there is any departure from the 
usual course of judicial proceedings, let alone, such a departure 
from the mainstream as to justify review by this Court. The 
petition should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of November, 1987. 
IPONEY & ASSOCIATES 
Ip&Ltr-r ^y 
Jerome^H^ ""ftooney 
Attorney fpr Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
brief in opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari were 
served upon Petitioner herein by placing four (4) copies of said 
Brief by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on November 23, 
1987,to the office of H. Mifflin Williams, III. at 200 American 
Savings Plaza, 77 West Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibit 1 - Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) 
Exhibit 2 - Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
Exhibit 3 - Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
RULE 52. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 52, Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, 
issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on 
all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
£/. 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC, a 
Utah corporation, and : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DAKAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, : CIVIL NO. C-83-2042 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al., : 
Defendants, : 
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of 
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (herein-
after "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title 
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"), 
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located 
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. In addition, 
defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American"), in plaintiffs' original action, has filed: (1) 
a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging 
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property 
and have been unjustly enriched a)t American1 s expense? (2) a 
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter 
£x. 2 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American 
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald 
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased 
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint 
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter 
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched 
at American's expense. 
II. FACTS 
The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen 
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and 
events dating back to 1978. The Court has carefully reviewed 
the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed 
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary 
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses. 
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts 
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of 
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration 
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore 
refer to such Stipulation when necessary. In the following 
Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where 
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Trans-
cript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court. 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity 
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order 
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular 
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is 
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally 
determines the rights and claims of all parties. An equity 
court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the 
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief 
of the parties. See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.; 
27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq. 
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers 
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court 
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to 
be done; and similarly, it can and should regard as not having 
been done that which ought not to have been done.H These state-
ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states 
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings." 
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by 
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements 
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following 
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties: 
A. NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY 
The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified 
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus 
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the 
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice" 
of American's security interest in the property which was 
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified. It 
is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight 
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been 
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice. The 
Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of 
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to 
statehood. Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before 
the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs. 
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual 
notice" as follows: 
This statute was under examination by 
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah 
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held 
that the "actual notice" required by 
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
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dealing with the land had information 
of facts which would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to 
the state of the title. See a similar 
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson, 
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948) 
[Emphasis added] 
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the 
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order 
to be a bona fide purchaser. In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah 
442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs. 
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement: 
[W]hatever is notice enough to excite 
attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of every-
thing to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, he 
shall be deemed conversant of it. 
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293. 
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows: 
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a 
reliable source from which the true 
state of facts will be naturally 
disclosed, it is not sufficient that 
the purchaser make an inquiry of a 
person when he knows that it is to 
such person's interest to misrepresent 
or conceal the existence of the out-
standing interests and that such 
person does deny its existence. 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case, 
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a 
bona fide purchaser of the property. The Court is in substantial 
agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages 
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984. 
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer 
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property 
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23). The Court also concludes 
that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the 
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal 
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal 
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs1 Exs. 5 & 6; 
Defendants' Exs. 4 2 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein). 
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified 
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual 
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, 
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are 
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust 
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American. 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more 
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry 
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation 
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing 
its Trust Deed on the property- Such an inquiry would have 
in all probability led to the discovery that neither the 
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. Both Pentelute 
and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed 
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were 
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and 
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at 
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises 
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants1 Exs. 35, 36, 
38, 40). 
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events 
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should 
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' 
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property. 
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property 
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less 
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00 
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for 
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21; Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the above-
mentioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly 
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers 
of the property under Utah statutory and case law. 
B. THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity 
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean 
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment. 
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that 
the Rydalches do have "unclean hands" by reason of their representa-
tions of fee simple ownership of the property with no security 
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property 
without the written or oral approval of American. 
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises 
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject 
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's 
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly 
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed 
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement 
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale 
or transfer of the property (Defendants' Ex. 35). The Rydalches 
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for 
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart 
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of 
the existence of Americanfs Non-Assumption Agreement, and that 
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title 
Co, for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain 
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the 
property (Defendants1 Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer 
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred 
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of 
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based 
upon an appraisal of the property by Academy Appraisal Associates 
(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance 
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed 
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40). 
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that 
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property 
was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have 
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable 
relief. It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with 
the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent 
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises. 
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable 
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their 
representations that American's interest in the property had 
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal. 
C. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT 
As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified 
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunction 
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra, 
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding 
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are 
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified 
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated. 
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to 
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid 
principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the 
same payment terms of principal and interest as American's original 
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the 
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Americcin's 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
security interest shall be Dakal. Dakal shall have six months 
to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any 
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance 
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such 
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal. All rental payments 
from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal. 
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the 
property. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches 
to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal. The $14,000.00 finders 
fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the 
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and 
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party 
to these proceedings. A Judgment by the Court is therefore 
rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00. 
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the 
property are terminated. 
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable 
of all the parties now before the Court. His only liability 
could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining 
the prior approval of American. Without ruling on the legal 
question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the 
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes 
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that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally 
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above. Therefore, 
all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property 
or American's claims against Liston are terminated. 
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most 
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated 
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino 
Corporation. However, none of these parties is now before the 
Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against 
any of them. 
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility 
for the events leading up to these proceedings. Although only 
mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the 
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the 
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its 
interest in the property. It is therefore the judgment of the 
Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which 
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court, 
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from 
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision, 
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and in accordance therewith. Such documents shall be submitted 
to the Court and other parties by ,-[nno ?n IQP,4 
Dated this JjO day of May, 1984 
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MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband 
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and 
wife; each idividually; and 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee 
and not individually; and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah bank-
ing corporation; and M & W ENTER-
PRISES, allegedly a Utah general 
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1 
through 10 being all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs' 
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THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
J day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
' viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
•Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A. 
Burnett, Esq. 
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, makes the following: 
I 
I 
PIHDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American") made a loan to Donald J. and Karen H. Bailey in the 
sum of $59,200, which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and 
a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, 
and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 
of Book 4619 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
2. The real property (hereinafter "property") described in 
said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official 
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
» 3. In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to 
: Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who 
assumed the Baileys1 loan with American upon American's approval 
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification 
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment. 
4. In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed 
the above-described loan, the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance 
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment did remain in effect as to subsequent sales« 
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5. On May 14f 1982, Liston gave to K & W Enterprises a War-
ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval 
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still sub-
ject to American's Trust Deed, 
6. On May 28r 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-
val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F. 
Rydalch (sometimes hereinafter "Rydalch") and his wife, Joan 
Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch 
as "Rydalches"). 
7# The Warranty Deed conveying the property from M & W 
Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property 
was subject to American's Trust Deed. 
8. The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, executed by the 
Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to 
American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed of Trust 
Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of Ameri-
can prior to any sale or transfer of the property. 
9. The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-
ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged 
that Stewart Title Company, the escrow and closing agent, had 
informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agree-
ment, and that the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify 
Stewart Title Company for any consequences resulting from the 
failure to obtain written approval from American prior to the 
transfer of the property. 
10. M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-
ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the 
Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and 
insurance on the property. 
11. Based upon an appraisal of the property by Academy 
Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received a title insurance 
policy from Stewart Title Company in the amount of $103,000. 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself, 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of 
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement. 
12. The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further 
indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that 
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
13. American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust 
Deed on the property by reconveyance which was recorded on 
December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in 
I the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
! 14. The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been 
• 
1
 paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given. Said Trust Deed 
» 
i continues to be unpaid. 
i 
} 15. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
1
 balance owed to American under its Trust Deed is the sum of 
$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total 
$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sura of $1,283.60, interest 
in the sun of $12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum of 
$1,956.28. CLYOC, PRATT. 
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16- On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit as 
Entry No, 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that 
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mis-
take, 
17. Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
18. On January 21, 1983, for the sum of $37,980, the 
Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
(sometimes hereinafter "Dakal") which on the same day, sold the 
property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes here-
inafter "Diversified" or "Diversified Equities") for the sum of 
$60,000. 
19. Prior to the sale of the property to Dakal
 if Defendant 
Rydalch represented to Dakal that American's interest in the pro-
i perty had been satisfied. 
j 20. At the time of the sale of the property from the 
i Rydalches to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President and principal 
executive officer of Dakal and Diversified. 
21. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
: the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
i 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
sified Equities. )C. PKATT. 
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27. Both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had substantial 
j experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate 
• transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market 
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's inter-
est in the property at the time the Rydalches acquired the pro-
perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the 
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches 
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien). 
28. The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value. 
» 
29. Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to 
Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal. 
— 30. Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the 
Rydalches to Dakal. 
31. Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the 
total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been 
j paid in escrow or are currently due. 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i 
1. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
i 
1
 cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to American and 
whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
the property. 
2. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the 
iobligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor any-
one else had paid American and that American's release of its 
Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. 
; 3. In addition, the Court concludes that Brad Pentelute 
and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that something was 
amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple 
ownership of the property. Supporting facts include the •dis-
tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approxi-
mately one-half or less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's 
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980, and the same-day transfer of the 
property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000. 
4. Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had "actual notice" of 
American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly 
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from 
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified. 
5. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
'. and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of 
; Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
6. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
J the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
sified Equities. 
7. The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck 
are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities in regard to 
American's Trust Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by Ameri-
can. 
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I 8. Therefore, Dakal and Diversified Equities had "actual 
notice" of American's security interest in the property which was 
* mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified Equi-
ties. 
i 9. Neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, Inc., 
nor Dakal, Inc., was a bona fide purchaser of the property. 
10. Thus, neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, 
Inc., nor Dakal, Inc. should be entitled to prevail over Ameri-
can's claims against the property. 
11. The Rydalches either knew or certainly should have known 
| that their obligation to American had not been paid, since they 
: had not done so and that American's release of its trust deed on 
i the property had to be a mistake. 
I 12. The Rydalches have "unclean hands" by reason of their 
i 
j representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no 
security interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the 
property without the written or oral approval of American. 
13. Because one who comes before a court of equity with 
"unclean hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treat-
ment , the Rydalches are not entitled to favorable„ equitable 
. relief, 
14. All transactions regarding the transfer of the property 
from Dakal to Diversified should be rescinded and all rights 
and/or liabilities of Diversified Equities to the property or 
Dakal, respectively, should be terminated. 
>c. PHATT. 
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15. Pursuant to its original trust deed dated January 27f 
1978, and recorded February 2r 1978f as Entry No. 3059974 at page 
826 in Book 4619 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder in Salt Lake County, Utah, American is entitled to an 
equitable lien upon the property for the amount of unpaid princi-
pal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the same pay-
ment terms as American's original trust deed (as set forth in this 
paragraph) and all other terms of said trust deed with the speci-
fic exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's 
security interest should be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc. 
16. Title to the property should be quieted in Dakal, sub-
ject to an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of 
unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely 
the same payment terms of principal and interest as American's 
original trust deed (dated January 27, 1978 and recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 2, 1978, as 
Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619) and all other terms of 
said trust deed, with the specific exception that the sole obligor 
or trustor of American's security interest should be Dakal. 
17. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
balance owed to American under its equitable lien is the sum of 
$56,742*92 and the arrearages under said equitable lien (which 
total $15,886.00) consist of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, 
interest in the sum of $12#626.12 and reserve account in the sum 
of $1,956,28. 
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Assumption Agreement, it would be inequitable for Defendant Liston 
to remain personally liable to American. 
28. All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Liston relat-
ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
terminated. 
29. All rights and/or liabilites of Defendant Liston relat-
ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
terminated. 
30. The Court concludes that because all of the parties now 
before the Court bear some responsibilities for the events leading 
up to these proceedings and because the result of the entire chain 
of events would not have occurred except for the negligent and 
unilateral mistake of American in releasing its interest in the 
property, each party should bear its own costs and attorneys fees. 
Also American is not entitled to any late fees which have accrued 
as of May 30, 1984. 
DATED this day of July, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick """" 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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